Japan's policy-level ODA (Official Development Assistance) evaluation has played a complementary role for project-level evaluation. Japan encountered policy-level challenges, mainly from OECD/DAC, beyond the level of project management. Some of policy recommendations derived from the policy-level evaluation exercises were useful, and seriously examined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Japan for realization. However, there are limitations to conducting the evaluation under the current framework of the assignment, which are (1) low level of independence and (2) little resources. Frequent interactions between stakeholder-divisions of MOFA and the evaluation team, including comment-revision repetitions to finalize a review report, risk the independence of a review. Consequently, views of stakeholders may substantially influence the report. Second, resources in terms of money, time and personnel are minimal to do the job. This limitation in resources weakens the independence of evaluation further. Thus, these two aspects jointly result in a low level of authority and little publicity of the evaluation.
Introduction
Japan conducts ODA (Official Development Assistance) evaluations at several levels. Its main ODA-implementing body, the Japan International Cooperation Agency 1 (JICA, for short) conducts project-level evaluations widely and continuously. At an upper level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) organizes so-called "third party" evaluation exercises on the policies / principles of ODA. MOFA calls this exercise "policy-level evaluation." Japan's ODA projects and programs for a specific recipient country, and those on a specific priority issue, sector, or modality, (MOFA 2018, 27-37) .
Third, JICA conducts comprehensive and sequential evaluations on projects under its responsibility. JICA has a rule that all projects taking more than two million yen must be reviewed, while those amounting to more than one billion yen must be evaluated by external experts. In the fiscal year 2016, JICA sponsored 192 project-evaluations and 99 of them were undertaken by external experts (JICA 2018, 4). JICA's evaluations also have sequentially long time-horizons. JICA has a policy that requires following a feedback loop of evaluation and improvement, the "PDCA Cycle." PDCA is the abbreviation of Plan-Do-Check-Act (JICA 2018, 2-3; MOFA 2018, 38-39) .
"Plan" is a deep examination before implementing an ODA project, and this pre-project examination is referred to as "ex-ante evaluation." "Do" encompasses the implementation of a project. At this stage of the project cycle, frequent "monitoring" of the progress of the project is encouraged.
"Check" is an "ex-post evaluation" of results of the ODA project. The final phase, "Act," is a 4 reflection on the ex-post evaluation and improvements that align with the recommendations associated with the ex-post evaluation.
Fourth, a Partner Country-led Evaluation is occasionally conducted at the initiative of MOFA, Japan. The client of this evaluation exercise is MOFA, and contractors are sought from the recipient country. All necessary costs for the exercise are owed by MOFA, Japan. For example, in the fiscal year 2017 only one "Partner Country-led Evaluation" project was organized, which was about Japan's ODA to the economic and social infrastructure sector in Samoa (Government of 6 . In addition, the report suggested how the results of an evaluation would be published to the public and how they would be routinely incorporated for improvements in Japan's ODA. Table 5 ), and Japan's implementation of the Paris Declaration 9 was reviewed in 2010 (Table 6) (Table 6 ). Table 2 shows when and which partner country was selected for a Country Assistance
Evaluation. Some countries were reviewed several times, while others were reviewed only once.
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Vietnam were reviewed as many as three times. These countries were often selected for Sector Program Evaluation as well (Table 4) . By contrast, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar and Nigeria are among those which have not been taken up for MOFA's evaluation, probably because the scale of Japan's ODA was small for a certain time period due to either security-related difficulties or polity issues.
Issues selected for Priority Issue Evaluation are divided into two categories. One includes fundamental high priority fields such as education, health, environment, and human security (Table   3 ). These fundamental issues also are reviewed for Sector Program Evaluation. The other fields for Priority Issue Evaluation are a set of timely issues. ODA associated with new concepts and initiatives are reviewed in this context. Examples are "The Initiative for Japan's ODA on Water and the Water and Sanitation Broad Partnership Initiative" (2008), and "Aid for Trade" (2011) (see Table   3 ).
Some Aid Modality Evaluation projects highlight Japan's new interests including grant aid for countries with relatively high income (2014) and grant aid for promotion of Japanese Standards (2016) (see Table 5 ). These are in line with Japan's new guideline for international cooperation, the Development Cooperation Charter, which replaced the ODA Charter in 2015. A critical difference compared to the Development Cooperation Charter from the ODA Charter is that national interests are explicitly mentioned in the former as an aim of cooperation. 8
How Does MOFA's Policy-Level Evaluation Work?
As mentioned above, the author was engaged in MOFA's policy-level evaluation projects eight times as the chief evaluator. Based upon these experiences, this subsection describes the structure and mechanism of a MOFA evaluation exercise. Table 7 contains a list of the eight evaluation projects on which the author served. An evaluation team consists of a chief evaluator, an advisor and a few employees of a contractor. During the FY2004-FY2009, when External Advisory Meeting (EAM) on ODA Evaluation was organized, a chief evaluator was selected from the members of EAM. Each member of EAM served an evaluation project for a year as its chief evaluator. After EAM was dissolved in 2010, a bidding consulting firm solicited an external expert for the chief evaluator and another for its advisor before tendering a bid for an evaluation project. Once the consulting firm wins a bid, the firm makes a contract with MOFA and hires the chief evaluator and the advisor.
The chief evaluator is assumed to be knowledgeable about international cooperation, ODA and evaluation. The advisor is an expert on the country / issue / sector which is the focus for the evaluation project. The chief evaluator is hired by both the contractor and MOFA; the costs for an evaluation trip abroad are directly incurred by MOFA, and other costs are owed by the contractor.
The chief evaluator is requested to represent the evaluation team.
The contract price is around 15 million Japanese yen. By construction, a lower bid price is preferred by MOFA. The contract period is typically between June and March of the next year Interviews during the business trip are the main inputs into the final report of an evaluation.
The team is requested to complete a first draft of the report in January, two months before the end of contract. The draft is read carefully by relevant officers of the ODA Evaluation Division and respective divisions and bureaus of MOFA, the embassy of Japan in the respective recipient countries, relevant departments of JICA, and JICA's country office. All of them send detailed comments on the draft for revisions. The evaluation team has to address all comments thoroughly.
That comments-responses exchange continues until both parties are satisfied. Meanwhile, the responsibility to meet the due date of submission of a final evaluation report lies with the evaluation team.
After the settlement of exchanges of comments and responses, the evaluation team is 9 requested to explain the draft in front of all responsible officers of MOFA and JICA in a final examination meeting. While EAM was in operation, all members of EAM attended the final examination meeting. All members of the EAM were supposed to be responsible for all reports regardless of its chief evaluator. After 2010, the evaluation team is obliged to solely defend the final draft in the final examination meeting.
With all parties' consents, the final draft is published in a book form and an electronic form. Its summary is translated into English and occasionally a local language Since the termination of EAM in 2010, face-to-face examination of reactions to recommendations given by review reports has not been implemented. As mentioned above, publication of the reactions in the Annual Report are used to make good use of the recommendations. and MDGs in the Health Sector) with eight different advisors and five consulting firms (Table 7) .
Reflections by a Third Party Academic Evaluator
Based on these experiences on the eight evaluation exercises, the following discussion focuses on the values of and challenges to MOFA's policy-level ODA Evaluation.
Values of and Challenges to MOFA's Policy-level ODA Evaluation

Values Statistical Approach as a Reference
In order to discuss the values of a MOFA's policy-level ODA evaluation, a statistical approach of impact evaluation is referred to for comparison. There are criticisms against non-statistical approaches to ODA evaluations (Banerjee 2007; Duflo and Kremer 2008, among others). The point of the criticisms is that non-statistical evaluation is likely to end up with a generic description of a successful project, wherein no comparison is made between a beneficiary entertaining an ODA project and the same beneficiary without the project. Though the latter does not exist in reality, its statistical analog may be created and called "counterfactual." Some methodologies to make appropriate comparisons between a group of beneficiaries with an intervention and a statistically (almost) equivalent group of beneficiaries without it, were developed and are now widely practiced in the society of project evaluation (see Gertler et al. 2011 ).
This statistical approach is known as a strong device to address any sample selection bias such that intrinsically advantageous beneficiaries are selected as awardees of a project. Then, the intrinsic advantage of the beneficiaries may work favorably irrespective of implementation of the project. An evaluator may be confused between an effect of the project and that of a beneficiary's intrinsic advantage. The statistical approach can address this sample selection bias effectively.
The greatest benefit of the statistical approach is that it returns an unbiased answer to the question of whether or not a project has a positive effect. This is the reason the statistical approach is recommended for impact evaluation.
In the meantime, there are some shortcomings to the statistical approach. First, details beyond success / failure are not available from the statistical approach. Suppose a difference between a group with an intervention and its control group turns out to be statistically insignificant. Then, the intervention is judged useless. However, why the intervention does not work is left unanswered.
Even in the case of success, the mechanism of the success is in a black box.
Second, the validity of a result from the statistical test is limited to a specific case where the test is made. In other words, a judgement derived from a statistical test is applicable only to the exact situation where the test is conducted. There is no guarantee that the same result will occur if there are different conditions. This low degree of applicability is known as the "external validity issue" (Rodrik 2009; Ravallion 2016, 304-310 This cost issue of repetition is crucial for policy-level evaluation, in the sense that some macroeconomic policies (e.g., tax, interest rate, tariff, and exchange rate) and great-scale infrastructure are not easily altered for an experiment purpose (Rodrik 2009 ).
Constructive Recommendation
In this author's interpretation, a main point of a MOFA's policy-level ODA evaluation is to provide constructive recommendations to improve the effectiveness of results, appropriateness of implementation processes and relevance of its policies. As the coverage of this evaluation is broad, and as the resources and the time that are allowed are limited, the statistical approach is beyond the scope of the evaluation. Therefore, the strictness of evaluations of the effectiveness of results has to be compromised and the evaluation exercise lacks strength in the level of its quantitative analyses.
Instead, more qualitative observations / recommendations must be the strength of MOFA's policy-level evaluations.
The meaningfulness of detailed constructive recommendations is testified by concrete examples of recommendations and incorporation of them into policies which were introduced afterward as responses to the recommendations. The following two examples are recommendations this author made as the chief evaluator for Country Assistance Evaluation of Madagascar (2006-07) and Vietnam . This author believes that the above qualitative recommendations derived from observations and educated guesses brought some benefits for practitioners of Japan's ODA. These detailed recommendations cannot be derived from the statistical approach.
Challenges
This author understands that there are challenges to MOFA's policy-level ODA evaluations.
They are the low level of independence and insufficient resources. Furthermore, the latter factor adversely affects the former factor.
Independence
Most of MOFA's policy-level ODA evaluation exercises are conducted by a "third party."
The rest are (1) a joint evaluation with other donors, a recipient country or NGOs, and (2) recipient government or agencies (MOFA 2018, pp. 56-61) . Thus, two main stakeholders, MOFA and JICA, are not supposed to be directly involved into this evaluation exercise as an evaluator. This non-involvement of the main stakeholders on donor's side may be counted as a factor to justify the impartiality and independence of evaluation according to a principle recommended by OECD. 13 In fact, DAC's peer review conducted in 2010 pointed out an independence issue, which was related only to the structural hierarchy such that the Office for Evaluation 14 was placed under the International Cooperation Bureau inside MOFA (OECD 2010, 61) . The review expressed concern that the International Cooperation Bureau was a strong stakeholder of ODA, and that this hierarchy might risk the independence of the evaluation. Once the Office of ODA Evaluation 15 was transferred to the Minister's Secretariat of MOFA, OECD's peer review conducted in 2014 concluded "more than 30 percent of total contract price must be used to purchase goods made in Japan. For details, see JICA (2013) . 13 More concretely, this principle is spelled out as follows: "(t)he evaluation process should be impartial and independent in its function from the process concerned with the policy-making, the delivery, and the management of development assistance." (OECD 1998, 42-46) 14 The exact name of the office was the "Office for Evaluation and Public Relations." 15 The present name of the office is "ODA Evaluation Division." 13 independence has been injected into MOFA's evaluation system" (OECD 2014, 72-73) .
This author, however, still finds that there are some issues of independence, which were not indicated in OECD peer reviews (OECD 2010; OECD 2014) .
( The bottom line is that the term of "third party evaluation" of policy-level ODA evaluation cannot be taken as it is meant. The information on ODA is asymmetrically granted between stakeholders and the evaluation team and unless a third party outsider has a high degree of competence, it cannot counter the well-informed stakeholders.
(2) Selection of Countries, Priority Issues and Sectors to Evaluate
The country / issue / sector to be selected for evaluation is determined inside MOFA. Around the time when the OECD peer review process started for Japan in 2010, the name of the evaluation division was the "Office for Evaluation and Public Relations" (OECD 2010, 61) .
This implies that MOFA wanted to use the ODA evaluation for the purpose of PR for Japan's ODA.
MOFA assumed that an ODA evaluation would be read favorably by the Japanese. The peer review in 2010 also pointed out that "visibility of Japanese ODA both to recipients and domestically" was added as a criterion to OECD/DAC's (OECD 2010, 61) . Thus, at that time, the score for an evaluation of Japan's ODA was higher if a project increased the visibility of Japan's contribution.
This arbitrary nature is also found in the selection of topics for Aid Modality Evaluation in recent years. "Grant Aid for Countries with Relatively High Income" was reviewed in 2014 (Table 5) .
This selection foresaw an emphasis added to the new Development Cooperation Charter which replaced ODA Charter in February 2015. The new concept of "development cooperation" includes assistance to "ODA graduated countries with special vulnerabilities." Examples of "special vulnerabilities" raised in the new charter are those related to the "middle income trap" and climate change. Rich countries in the Middle East are in the domain of this group of nations since a challenge to water supply is considered to be a "special vulnerability" caused by climate change.
Another strategic choice in the topics for review for Aid Modality Evaluation is defined in the 2016 "Grant Aid for Promotion of Japanese Standards." This aid is designed to promote Japan's national interests in exporting products made in Japan. The stress on national interests as an aim of assistance was a feature of the Development Cooperation Charter as well (Yamagata 2016) .
Promotion of Japanese standards is a new agenda to raise the welfare of the Japanese through the industrial development of Japan. This explicit spelling-out of pursuits for national interests is quite novel in the realm of international cooperation and irrelevant to people in developing countries. Thus, these two topics, the "Grant Aid for Countries with Relatively High Income" and "Grant Aid for
Promotion of Japanese Standards," are unlikely to be random choices made by the ODA Evaluation Division, and look more likely to be suggested by the International Cooperation Bureau, which is a direct stakeholder of Japan's ODA.
(3) Selection of projects to visit
Even in the processes for an evaluation operation, an evaluation team greatly depends on judgements made by stakeholders. When the team visits the designated country for evaluation, the team's movements inside the country are under the total control of the embassy of Japan in the country. If the evaluation team wants to visit any sites Japan's ODA provided, the team needs to obtain permissions for the visit from relevant ministries of the recipient country supervising the project and the embassy of Japan. If they are not sure about whether a positive evaluation will be made by the evaluation team, they can discourage the team from the visit or refrain from providing cooperation that will facilitate the team's obtaining permission for the visit from related ministries.
The bottom line is: the evaluation team conducting a MOFA's policy-level ODA evaluation is not granted strong authority to enforce information disclosure.
Resources
In monetary terms, the scale of an evaluation exercise is around 15 million Japanese yen Hence, interactions between them and the evaluation team in the process of drafting the review report affects the contents of the report significantly. Secondly, resources in terms of money, time and personnel available to complete a report in Japanese and its summaries in English are minimal
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The contractor nature of the evaluation team and the allocation of few resources result in a low level of authority and little publicity of the evaluation. In this author's view, the drastic decline in the number of this policy-level evaluation projects over the last five years symbolizes MOFA's low expectation of this evaluation exercise.
So far comprehensive reviews of Japan's ODA-evaluation have been made only by OECD as a peer review (OECD 2010 , OECD 2014 . OECD peer review teams visit Japan for weeks to write a review as a neutral outsider. By contrast this paper is written by an insider of MOFA's policy-level evaluation who participated in eight evaluation exercises as a chief evaluator of evaluation teams. Thus, this paper contains more detailed information on ground-level evaluation exercises than OECD's peer review reports. Moreover, as long as the author notices, no other persons who were deeply involved in any of the evaluation exercises have ever written a comprehensive report on how Japan's policy-level ODA evaluation works in the past decade.
Therefore, the author argues that this article contains unique observations which are exposed for the first time.
17 OECD Peer Review 2014 also pointed out this resource issue (OECD 2014, p. 72) .
Finally, for improvements of Japan's policy-level ODA evaluation, both MOFA and external experts face challenges. As discussed above, MOFA had better enhance the level of independence of ODA evaluation. Contrary to the peer review report made by OECD (2014) What are lacking in an evaluation team to raise the level of independence are resources and power to enforce disclosure of information.
External experts have to be equipped with deep knowledge in international development and wide experiences on international cooperation. High expertise in terms of knowledge and experiences is necessary to work out meaningful and feasible recommendations. Enhanced independence must be associated with great competence of external experts in ODA evaluation. 
